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Abstract  
While the trade statistics of Myanmar show surpluses for 2007 through 2010, the 
corresponding statistics of trade partner countries indicate deficits. Such 
discrepancies in mirror trade statistics are analyzed in connection with the 
‘export-first and import-second’ policy provisioning import permissions on 
permission applicants possessing a sufficient amount of the export-tax-deducted 
export earnings. Under this policy, the recorded imports and exports of the private 
sector have been maintaining equilibrium, whereas discrepancies in the mirror 
statistics have fluctuated. This suggests that traders adjusted mis-reporting in 
accordance with the supply and demand of the export earnings. 
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Trade Policies and Trade Mis-reporting in Myanmar1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Government of Myanmar introduced various restrictive controls on trade in order to 
manage scarce foreign exchange in the 1990s. One of such controls is the so-called 
‘export-first and import-second’ policy that provisions the issuance of import licenses 
on the possession of a sufficient amount of export-tax-deducted export earnings to cover 
the import bill. This policy might have prompted traders to adjust mis-reporting of trade 
in accordance with the supply and demand for export earnings. This paper analyzes how 
Myanmar trade policies provided traders with incentives to mis-report trade, and 
examines the extent of mis-reporting. 
This paper employs the mirror statistics of Myanmar’s exports and imports to 
examine the extent of mis-reporting. The mirror statistics are the sets of Myanmar’s 
trade records and the corresponding records of trade partner countries. The causes of 
discrepancies in mirror statistics can be divided broadly into two categories: technical 
factors such as time lags in reporting on the one hand, and false declarations and 
smuggling by traders on the other2. Following the literature on trade mis-invoicing 
(Fisman and Wei, 2004; Yalta and Demir, 2010), it is assumed that the trade statistics of 
Myanmar’s trade partners are accurate, and that the incentive factors are dominant 
causes of the discrepancies. With these assumptions, this paper regards the 
discrepancies in the mirror statistics as an indication of mis-reporting by Myanmar 
traders. 
Literature on the opportunistic responses of traders to trade policies is on the increase. 
The most extensively analyzed issue is evasion of import duties (Fisman and Wei, 2004; 
Javorcik and Narciso, 2008; Mishra et al., 2008). Using commodity-level data, these 
studies presented the correlation between the import tariff rates and the discrepancies in 
mirror statistics as supportive evidence of tax evasion. In addition, Yalta and Demir 
(2010) found that the export subsidies induced over-invoicing of exports in Turkey. 
Biswas and Marjit (2005) presented an analysis that shows the impacts of the dual 
                                                  
1 The author would like to thank Nu Nu Lwin, Kazunobu Hayakawa, Toshihiro Kudo 
and colleagues at the Institute of Developing Economies for suggestions and 
encouragement. Any remaining errors and omissions are the responsibility of the 
author. 
2 Hamanaka (2011a: 601-603) provides an extensive list on the causes of discrepancies 
in the mirror data. 
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exchange rate as implicit import subsidies and as implicit export tax in India. Where 
trade policies differ, so do the responses of traders. The present paper contributes to this 
literature by offering a case study of Myanmar trade policies. 
The inaccuracy of trade statistics might lead the policymakers to develop erroneous 
economic policies. While the trade statistics of Myanmar show trade surpluses for 2007 
through 2010, the trade balance for Myanmar in the Direction of Trade Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been in deficit for the same period. Detecting 
the causes of the discrepancies in the trade statistics and correcting the incentives for 
traders to mis-report, if any, would improve the accuracy of trade statistics and add to 
better policy formation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview 
of the trade policies of Myanmar, and clarifies their possible impacts on incentives for 
traders to mis-report. Section III presents hypotheses on trade mis-reporting behaviors 
of both exporters and importers in reaction to the trade policies. Section IV examines 
the hypotheses using the mirror statistics of both the aggregated data and the 
disaggregated data for each trade partner country. Section V summarizes the analyses 
and presents policy options for trade reform. 
 
 
II. Trade Policies and Incentives to Mis-report Trade 
 
II.1 Trade Policies3 
This subsection overviews trade policies of Myanmar, and then discusses the impacts of 
such policies on incentives for traders to mis-report trade. Here, mis-reporting includes 
under- or over-invoicing of exports and imports on the one hand, and smuggling on the 
other. Smuggling refers to imports and exports that do not undergo clearance at 
Myanmar Customs. 
Administrative controls on trade differ between the private and public sectors. State 
economic enterprises (SEEs) are integrated with the state budget, and their foreign trade 
is centrally controlled by the government. Their imports are financed with the allocation 
of foreign exchange from the state budget. Their export revenues have to be surrendered 
to the state budget. Given their integrality in the state budget, it might be appropriate to 
consider that the public sector has less incentive to mis-report trade to Myanmar 
                                                  
3 Since Myanmar’s new government took office in March 2011, substantial reforms in 
economic policies, including trade policies, are ongoing. The description of trade policies 
in this subsection refers to the condition prior to March 2011. 
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Customs. In addition, they are exempted from trade taxes and duties. 
While Myanmar practices a multiple exchange rate system4, the official exchange rate 
is applied only within the public sector. The private sector has no allocation of foreign 
exchange at the official exchange rate, or the surrender requirement on export earnings. 
The foreign exchange market is effectively segmented between the private and public 
sectors (Hori and Wong, 2008).  
The government applies various trade restrictions only to the private sector. Controls 
on exports consist of (i) export licensing, and (ii) export taxes. All exports are subject to 
licensing with conditionality. Export licenses have been issued on condition that 
payments are remitted via Myanmar state banks. In addition, commodities like precious 
stones, rice, sesame, and teakwood have been prohibited from exporting or licenses 
have been strictly controlled in favor of the public sector and the cronies5. 
Export earnings of the private sector are subject to a 10 percent export tax, which 
consists of a commercial tax of 8 percent and an income tax of 2 percent6. The export 
tax is collected in foreign currency when export earnings are remitted to state banks. 
After the deduction of the export tax, exporters are permitted to maintain the export 
earnings as foreign currency deposits (FCDs) at state banks. Since the foreign exchange 
regulation prohibits Myanmar people from holding foreign currency, it is the right as 
well as the duty of exporters to maintain their export earnings as FCDs. While informal 
holding of foreign currency has been tolerated and widespread, it cannot be deposited as 
FCD at state banks. 
On the other hand, controls on imports include (i) import licensing, and (ii) import 
duties. All imports of the private sector are subject to licensing with conditionality. First, 
since July 1997, as a general rule, import licenses have been issued on condition that 
applicants possess sufficient export-tax-deducted export earnings to cover imports bills. 
For an applicant without export earnings, the government curtailed the amount of 
import license to USD50,000 per month7. This ceiling was reduced incrementally to 
USD30,000 in January 1999, and to USD10,000 in August 2000 (Kudo and Mieno, 
2009: 108). Imports without the export earnings became virtually impossible thereafter. 
This policy is often called the ‘export-first and import-second’ policy. 
                                                  
4 As of January 2012, the official exchange rate is around 5.3 kyat per US dollar, while 
the prevalent parallel market exchange rate is 800 kyat per US dollar. 
5 These are listed in the Minister’s Office Order of the Ministry of Commerce, No.10/99, 
November 1999. 
6 In consideration of the sharp appreciation of the local currency against the US dollar, 
the government temporarily suspended export tax for six months from September 2011. 
7 For such a case, an importer opens a letter of credit at state banks with foreign 
exchange certificates (FEC). 
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Import license applicants obtain the export-tax-deducted export earnings from either 
own exports or purchasing from exporters through account transfers of FCDs. The 
export earnings with proof of the payment of the export tax are traded in the private 
sector at competitive prices. In fact, the export earnings are traded in the parallel foreign 
exchange market with a mark-up over the price of the informally held foreign currency. 
Second, the Ministry of Commerce proclaimed the Minister’s Office Order No.4/98 
in March 1998 to restrict the imports of consumption goods. Commodities were 
classified into two groups: essentials of List A, mainly capital goods and industrial raw 
materials, and non-essentials of List B, mostly consumption goods. Then, the Ministry 
provisioned the issuance of licenses on applicants importing at least 80 percent of the 
total from List A, and less than 20 percent from List B. While there has been no official 
announcement, this regulation is believed to have been invalidated since April 2005. 
Third, there are some items such as vehicles and fuel oil, and edible oil of which 
imports are prohibited or import licenses are tightly controlled. For example, the public 
sector used to monopolize the imports of fuel oil and imposed rationing on distribution 
until the deregulation in 2010. 
Import duties consist of tariffs and specific duties. As of 2003, the simple average 
applied tariff rate in nominal terms was 6.1 percent (Mizuno 2007), and the maximum 
tariff rate, applied to automobiles, was 40 percent. These figures are lower compared to 
neighboring Thailand. Nonetheless, on top of import tariffs, specific duties are levied on 
imported goods at Customs. The tax rate of specific duties for most imported goods is 
25 percent. While there is no discrimination of specific duties between imported and 
domestically produced goods, tax collection on imported goods at Customs is easier 
than on domestically produced goods.  
For calculation of import duties, Myanmar Customs use an overvalued official 
exchange rate for valuing imported goods, so that the effective rate of import duties is 
much lower than the nominal rate. For example, when the prevalent parallel market rate 
was around 1,000 kyat per US dollar in August 2010, the valuation rate was at 450 kyat, 
which more than halved the effective tax rate. Discretionary adjustments of the 
valuation rate caused sharp rises in the effective rate of import duties in June 1996 and 
June 20048. Besides, the overvalued valuation rate in principle has lowered the effective 
rate of import duties.  
The differences in administrative controls between the public and private sectors 
warrant focusing on the private sector in the subsequent analysis. 
                                                  
8 The valuation rate was raised from the official exchange rate of 5.91 kyat per US 
dollar to 100 kyat in June 1996 (Mizuno, 2007: 44) and to 450 kyat in June 2004. 
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II.2 Incentive to Mis-report Trade 
These restrictive trade policies on the private sector are expected to provide traders with 
complex incentives for mis-reporting. First, export taxes and import duties would 
provide both exporters and importers with incentives to under-invoice and smuggle. For 
those countries like Turkey where the government grants export subsidies, exporters 
have incentives to over-invoice (Yalta and Demir, 2010). The export tax in Myanmar 
would work in the opposite way. 
Second, prohibition and tight licensing of both exports and imports would stimulate 
smuggling. For example, the government in principle prohibited the private sector from 
exporting rice until 2007 in order to maintain low rice prices in the domestic market. 
Nonetheless, the price gap between the domestic market and the international market 
stimulated the smuggling of rice to neighboring countries (Tin Soe and Fisher, 1990). 
Similarly, while the government monopolized the market of fuel oil until 2010, the 
pervasive black markets implied that part of the fuel oil in the black market was 
smuggled to Myanmar. 
Third, the multiple exchange rate system of Myanmar would not provide incentives 
to mis-report. Biswas and Marjit (2005) developed a model to describe the behaviors of 
traders under the dual exchange rate system of India. When the official exchange rate 
overvalues the local currency and importers have foreign exchange allocation at such a 
favorable rate, they would have incentives to over-invoice to receive foreign exchange 
in excess. At the same time, exporters would have incentives to under-invoice to retain 
foreign exchange and sell it on the black market. For Myanmar, private importers have 
no allocation of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate, while private exporters 
can retain the full amount (after export taxes) of export earnings in foreign currency. 
Given these characteristics, the multiple exchange rate system itself would not be 
relevant to mis-reporting in Myanmar. 
Fourth, and most importantly, the conditionality of the export earnings for import 
licenses might provide peculiar incentives to mis-report. For importers, without a 
sufficient supply of export earnings, they cannot obtain import licenses, which would 
push out part of the import demand to under-invoicing and smuggling. A shortage in the 
export earnings in the parallel market would constrain proper reporting of imports. 
 
II.3 Constraints on Mis-reporting, and Border Trade 
The discussion so far has proceeded on the proviso that traders would adjust trade 
mis-reporting without any constraints. In fact, this is not the case at all. As for exports, 
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since the export tax is levied, exporters, if possible, would never properly report exports. 
The actual situation has been that the export earnings in the form of FCDs are traded in 
the parallel foreign exchange market with a fluctuating mark-up, and sometimes a 
discount, relative to the price of the informally held foreign currency. For the period 
from August 2007 through October 2011, the mark-up fluctuated between 12.8 percent 
and - 8.6 percent9. First, the fact that importers accepted a mark-up and effectively 
shouldered the export tax suggests that importers could not under-report imports 
without constraints; they have to import at least partially with import licenses, for which 
export earnings are necessary. Second, a mark-up below the export tax rate implies that 
exporters could not under-report exports without constraints either. 
Furthermore, there is one exogenous factor that would affect the level of 
mis-reporting: the rise in border trade. The control of the central government over 
border areas has been weak. Insurgencies by ethnic minority groups have been most 
severe in the region near the Myanmar-Northern Thai border. It was not until 2004 that 
the provisional cease-fire agreement was concluded between the central government and 
ethnic minorities in this region. While the improved political stability gave impetus to 
border trade, the government has tolerated smuggling in the border areas.  
As far as the border trade with Thailand is concerned, the goods to Myanmar that do 
not pass through Myanmar Customs are believed to be mostly recorded by Thai 
Customs as exports to Myanmar. Thailand imposes a 7 percent value-added tax (VAT) 
on the sales of goods in the domestic market, and this VAT is exempted in the case of 
exports. Thus, smugglers of Thai goods into Myanmar have an incentive to undertake 
customs declarations at Thai Customs to obtain VAT refunds. To facilitate such 
transactions, there are quasi- border posts in the Thai territory corresponding to the 
smuggling points in the Myanmar territory. The situation is similar in the 
Myanmar-China border areas. A rise in such imports is associated with a rise in 
under-reporting of imports. 
 
 
III. Hypotheses on Trade Mis-reporting 
 
This section presents hypotheses on how traders of the private sector select the level of 
mis-reporting under various constraints. As a first step, the equilibrium of the parallel 
foreign exchange market is considered. The parallel market handles both the 
                                                  
9  According to the unpublished data of the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) Yangon Office. 
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export-tax-deducted export earnings and the informally held foreign exchange.  
To identify the supply and demand of each type of foreign exchange, trade of the 
private sector can be classified into four categories in relation to customs clearance in 
Myanmar and in a trade partner country: (i) reported both in Myanmar and the partner 
country, (ii) reported in the partner country but not in Myanmar, (iii) not reported in 
either country, and (iv) reported in Myanmar but not in the partner country. These are 
summarized in Figure 1. Entry 2 includes the smuggling imports of strictly controlled 
goods such as fuel oil and vehicles as well as under-invoiced imports. Entries 6 and 7 
include smuggling exports of restricted items such as rice and teakwood. They may be 
reported at the Customs of a trade partner country or not, but certainly not at Myanmar 
Customs due to the export licensing. Entry 7 also includes illegal goods such as 
narcotics10.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Entries 2 and 4 as well as Entries 6 and 8 consist of the discrepancies in the mirror 
statistics of trade between Myanmar and a trade partner. For argument’s sake, this paper 
rules out Entries 4 and 8 of Figure 1 by assumption11; it is assumed that discrepancies 
entirely come from the Myanmar side. It should be also noted that Entries 3 and 7 do 
not account for discrepancies as they are not recorded at either end. 
The imports and exports reported at the Customs of any trading partner are denoted 
by M and X, respectively. M can be decomposed into those reported to Myanmar 
Customs (Entry 1 of Figure 1), and those unreported (Entry 2). The former is denoted 
by ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯ , where ߙ  stands for the proportion of mis-reported imports. 
Over-invoicing of imports is depicted with a negative value of ߙ. The net unreported 
portion of M at Myanmar Customs can be described as ݉ܽݔ ሺ0, ߙܯሻ. When there is net 
under-invoicing or smuggling, this is reduced to ߙܯ. When there is net over-invoicing, 
this is zero. Analogously, X can be decomposed into the reported portion at Myanmar 
Customs, ሺ1 െ ߚሻܺ, and the unreported portion, ݉ܽݔሺ0, ߚܺሻ, where ߚ stands for the 
proportion of mis-reported exports. The former corresponds to Entry 5 of Figure 1, and 
the latter Entry 6. A negative ߚ indicates net over-invoicing by Myanmar exporters. As 
for the unreported trade at either the Customs of Myanmar or trading partner countries 
                                                  
10 According to World Drug Report 2011 of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, the total potential farm-gate value of opium production in Myanmar is USD177 
million in 2010. Myanmar is the world’s second largest illicit opium-producing country, 
next to Afghanistan. 
11 This assumption is made implicitly in Yalta and Demir (2010) among others. 
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(Entries 3 and 7), the imports and exports are denoted by M’ and X’, respectively.  
The equilibrium of the parallel foreign exchange market is described as follows: 
 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺ1 െ ߚሻܺ,     (1) 
ߙܯ ൅ܯᇱ ൌ ߚܺ ൅ ܺᇱ ൅ ܤ,     (2) 
where t represents the export tax rate and B stands for net informal capital flows to the 
private sector such as workers’ remittances. Equation (1) refers to the equilibrium of the 
market for export earnings in the form of FCDs. The left hand side of the equation 
represents the demand for the export earnings, and the right hand side the supply. Unless 
exports are reported to Myanmar Customs and the export tax is deducted, they cannot 
be labeled as export earnings12. Equation (2) expresses the equilibrium of the market for 
the informally held foreign currency. 
With this setting, consideration is given to how exporters and importers select the 
level of ߙ and ߚ. Except for the imports and exports of prohibited commodities, 
traders are supposed to adjust mis-reporting by taking into account the expected costs 
and benefits of mis-reporting. 
First, the hypothesis on exporters is that they adjust ߚ by comparing the expected 
selling price of their export revenue with proper reporting and that with mis-reporting. 
Unreported export revenues can be sold on the black market, while there are risks of 
penalty and costs of bribes to the authorities for under-invoicing and smuggling 
exports13. In contrast, reported export earnings are taxed by 10 percent, but they can be 
maintained as FCDs at state banks. However, the export earnings in the form of FCDs 
are illiquid assets due to the restrictions on withdrawal. It is only importers that have 
demand for export earnings and are therefore inclined to accept a degree of mark-up 
above the black market exchange rate. Unless sold to importers through account 
transfers, they can be withdrawn only in the foreign exchange certificates (FECs) which 
are traded on the black market usually with some discounts relative to the price of the 
greenback. Thus, when the demand for export earnings is low in comparison with the 
supply, exporters might under-report exports. Similarly, when the demand is relatively 
high, they might over-report exports to meet the demand. 
Second, the hypothesis on importers is that they adjust ߙ by comparing the expected 
                                                  
12  The government extends the definition of ‘export earnings’ periodically. Since 
January 2010, foreign currency incomes from services, including the revenues of local 
hotels, are treated as ‘export earnings’ once the 10 percent income tax is paid. 
13 There are a number of cases where under-invoiced imports were confiscated at 
Customs. In June 2006, more than 300 Customs officials were arrested simultaneously 
for corruption; overlooking smuggling and taking bribes from traders. 
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costs of imports with proper reporting and that with mis-reporting. In addition to import 
duties, proper reporting requires importers to comply with the conditionality for import 
licensing. The cost of the conditionality includes the mark-up of the export earnings 
over the black market exchange rate for the greenback. Under-reporting of imports 
allows importers to save the above-mentioned costs, whereas there are the risks of 
penalty as well as the costs of bribes to the authorities. 
Two events are considered to have affected the expected costs of imports significantly. 
One is the suspension of the import licensing conditionality with Lists A and B in April 
2005. This is considered to have reduced the costs to comply with the licensing 
conditionality because importers of consumer goods are no longer obliged to import 
low-demand capital goods. The other is the rise in border trade from 2004. This might 
have lowered the costs of smuggling as the probability of the detection of mis-reporting 
would decrease. 
Table 1 summarizes the hypothesized impacts of policies and events on mis-reporting 
and on trade volume. For example, an increase in the demand for the export earnings 
(FCDs) is expected to reduce ߚ and raise the recorded exports of the private sector, 
ሺ1 െ ߚሻܺ. As for the rise in border trade, it is expected to raise ߙ and M, whereas it is 
ambiguous whether ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯ increases or not since two changes in ߙ and M offset 
each other. These hypotheses are examined with trade statistics in the next section. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Apart from the factors in Table 1, the market for the informally held foreign exchange 
may exert influences on ߙ and ߚ. For example, a rise in the smuggling of narcotics (X’ 
in Equation (2)) would increase the supply of informally held foreign exchange, which 
in turn might stimulate the under-reporting of imports (a rise in ߙ). However, since M’, 
X’ and B are not observable, an analysis of this factor is beyond the scope of this 
paper14. 
 
 
IV. Trade Data Analysis 
 
IV.1 Data Sources and Their Characteristics 
                                                  
14 There are studies that deal with the border trade of which the flows of commodities 
are captured by neither the home country nor the trade partner. These include Connolly 
et al. (1995) on Paraguay, Golub and Mbaye (2009) on The Gambia and Senegal, and 
Menon (1999) on Lao PDR. 
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There are three sources of trade data15: (1) Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, 
compiled by the Central Statistical Organization of the Government of Myanmar 
(hereafter SMEI), (2) Direction of Trade Statistics of the International Monetary Fund 
(hereafter DOTS), and (3) Customs data of Myanmar’s trading partners retrieved from 
the World Trade Atlas database of Global Trade Information Services. 
Myanmar’s exports and imports reported in DOTS are mostly consistent with the 
Customs data of trading partner countries. In most cases, the exports (imports) to 
Myanmar in trade partners’ customs data and Myanmar’s imports (exports) in DOTS 
differ by only the 1.10 CIF/FOB factor in the terminology of Hamanaka (2011: 603)16. 
This implies that DOTS data are compiled mostly from the customs data of Myanmar’s 
trading partners.  
The subsequent analysis mainly utilizes SMEI and DOTS. In principle, they should 
be identical. Then, on the assumption that DOTS data is accurate, discrepancies 
between them might be interpreted as mis-reporting. 
As for SMEI, the published data includes either disaggregation by commodities or by 
trading partners, but the commodities data disaggregated for each trading partner are not 
available. For the data by commodities, the total imports are classified into 28 
commodities plus the remainder, and the total exports are classified into 24 commodities 
plus the remainder. These are not based on the Harmonized System of classification. 
This hampers commodity-level analysis of mirror statistics. For the data by trading 
partners, the published data reports on 14 major trading partner countries for Myanmar 
exports, and 13 partners for Myanmar imports17. 
An interesting feature of SMEI is that it publishes the total exports and imports by 
ownership, namely the exports and imports of the public sector and those of the private 
sector. The report of trade values by ownership per se implies that administrative 
controls are different between the two sectors. Assuming that mis-reporting does not 
exist in the public sector, the combination of this data and DOTS data allows us to 
examine the extent of trade mis-reporting in the private sector. 
                                                  
15  Another data source is the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (UN 
comtrade) database. Since Myanmar does not report trade statistics to the UN comtrade 
database except for the import data in 2001, this paper does not use this data source. 
16 CIF stands for the cost definition of the sum of cost, insurance and freight, while FOB 
stands for another cost definition of cost only (free on board). It is a common practice to 
compile export data in FOB and import data in CIF. Furthermore, the differences 
between CIF and FOB are often assumed to be 10 percent. This is the 1.10 CIF/FOB 
factor. 
17 These countries and regions include China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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IV.2 Aggregated Data Analysis 
Table 2 summarizes the trade statistics from SMEI and DOTS for the period from fiscal 
year 1997 through 2010. Since Myanmar’s fiscal year runs from April to the following 
March, DOTS data is compiled using the quarterly data to match the fiscal year. Fiscal 
year 1997 is set as the starting year from the consideration on the quality of DOTS data; 
for example, DOTS does not report the trade between Myanmar and Thailand prior to 
January 1999.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
In this table, the imports and exports of the private sector in SMEI correspond to 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯ  and ሺ1 െ ߚሻܺ  of Equation (1), respectively. Furthermore, on the 
assumption that the trade of the public sector is properly reported to both the Customs 
of Myanmar and the trading partners, (Total Exports Reported in DOTS – Government 
Exports Reported in SMEI) can be regarded as the equivalent to X in Equation (1). 
Similarly, (Total Imports Reported in DOTS – Government Imports Reported in SMEI) 
can be regarded as M. Accordingly, the ratio of the Private Exports Reported in SMEI to 
(Total Exports Reported in DOTS – Government Exports Reported in SMEI) is 
equivalent to ሺ1 െ ߚሻ, and the ratio of the Private Imports Reported in SMEI to (Total 
Imports Reported in DOTS – Government Imports Reported in SMEI) as ሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
Finally, the table includes the ratio of the private imports to the private exports to 
indicate the balance between the supply and demand for the export earnings. Based on 
this data set, developments in the trade volume and in the discrepancies in mirror 
statistics are examined in order. 
Regarding the trade volume, the table shows an increasing trend for the total exports. 
The growth is largely attributable to the exploration of natural gas. Natural gas exports 
were zero in 1997, USD1,015 million in 2004, and USD2,906 million in 2009. Natural 
gas exports are registered in the public sector, accounting for 64 percent of the exports 
of the government in 2009.  
In contrast, the total imports were repressed until around 2005, and showed an 
increasing trend from 2006. According to SMEI data, the imports of the private sector 
had remained around the same level for nearly one decade by 2005. The subsequent 
growth in the imports coincided with the suspension of the import license conditionality 
with Lists A and B. 
The ratio of the private imports to the private exports far exceeded 100 percent in the 
12 
 
1990s and then converged in the vicinity of 100 percent by 2000. Such a development 
of the ratio is consistent with the implementation of the ‘export-first’ policy. As the 
government tightened the policy progressively, it became almost impossible for 
importers to obtain import licenses without the export earnings from 2000. 
Next, regarding the discrepancies in the mirror statistics, they are smaller in exports 
than in imports. The same tendency is observed for Cambodia and Lao PDR in 
Hamanaka (2011a, 2011b). 
The discrepancies in the mirror statistics of exports and imports are contrastive. For 
the Myanmar exports, discrepancies changed from Myanmar’s under-reporting into 
over-reporting. The ratio of SMEI to DOTS remained mostly below 100 percent until 
2005, and it has remained in excess of 100 percent since 2006. For the Myanmar 
imports, the discrepancies exhibited a weak deepening trend. While the recorded 
imports of the private sector reached USD 2 billion in 2006, the discrepancy ratio of 
SMEI to DOTS fluctuated between 40 and 70 percent thereafter. 
By piecing together the observations on the volume of trade and on the discrepancies 
in the mirror statistics, the hypotheses on trade mis-reporting are examined as follows. 
First, both the suspension of the import restriction with Lists A and B and the rise in 
border trade are considered to expand imports, M. At the same time, the degree of 
mis-reporting of imports, ߙ, does not exhibit a clear trend probably due to that these 
two changes offset each other. 
Second, the private exports and private imports have been more or less balanced since 
2000. This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that the supply and demand of 
the export earnings affect ߙ and ߚ. In general, the available data do not enable us to 
identify whether the demand for the export earnings constrained ߚ, or the supply 
constrained ߙ. As far as the over-invoicing of private exports from 2006 is concerned, 
the phenomenon conforms to the hypothesis that an increase in the demand for export 
earnings reduces ߚ. 
 
IV.3 Country-wise Data Analysis 
Table 3 summarizes the mirror statistics of the Myanmar exports and imports 
disaggregated for each of the major trading partners. The table shows a five-year 
average for the periods of 2001 through 2005 and 2006 through 2010. Since the time lag 
of reporting exports at the origin and imports at the destination can cause discrepancies 
in the mirror statistics, a five-year average is taken to alleviate such a problem. 
 
TABLE 3 
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For the exports, the discrepancies in the mirror statistics with Thailand and Singapore 
are noteworthy. First, the discrepancies are small with Thailand. Around 80 percent of 
the Myanmar exports to Thailand are natural gas through pipelines, and this is managed 
by a state economic enterprise. Thus, there is little room for discrepancies. 
Second, the mirror statistics on exports to Singapore always show large 
over-reporting. This might be related with the export licensing conditionality. The 
issuance of export licenses is conditioned on advance payments or irrevocable letters of 
credit to Myanmar state banks, which is often not straightforward. To circumvent this 
conditionality, Myanmar companies often establish affiliated companies in the free port 
of Singapore. First, the affiliated companies remit the payment by telegraphic transfer, 
and commodities are shipped to Singapore. Then, the affiliated companies re-export 
commodities to destinations, and foreign importers pay the bill in deferred payments to 
the affiliated companies. While Myanmar Customs record such transactions as exports 
to Singapore, Singapore Customs do not record them as imports from Myanmar. 
Finally, the large over-reporting of exports is observed for the United States and 
Hong Kong. The United States imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar in 2003, and 
since then has prohibited imports from Myanmar. Thus, the discrepancies are in 
principle due to the misclassification of the destination/origin of goods. For the case of 
Hong Kong, reasons are yet to be analyzed. 
For the imports, under-reporting is the most severe with Thailand, and to some lesser 
extent with China. These are two neighboring countries, and the border trade consists of 
a large part of the bilateral trade with them. Table 4 summarizes the trends of the 
imports through land borders for China and Thailand. This table uses the data from 
Chinese and Thai Customs as for the corresponding records of Myanmar’s imports; the 
1.10 CIF/FOB factor is not adjusted. For the case of Thailand, a clear tendency is 
observed that as the proportion of the border trade increases, under-reporting deepens. 
 
TABLE 4 
 
The situation is different for the imports from China. There is no clear increasing 
trend in the proportion of the border trade to the total imports. While the border trade 
has been growing, the total imports have grown faster. In addition, the Customs data 
from China and Thailand show that the composition of Myanmar’s imports from China 
exhibits a higher proportion of capital goods and industrial raw materials, whereas the 
imports from Thailand contain a higher proportion of consumption goods such as 
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beverages. Given that the imports of the public sector concentrate on capital goods and 
industrial raw materials, it is conjectured that the proportion of the imports by the public 
sector is higher with China than with Thailand. This may account for the difference in 
the level of mis-reporting for the imports from these two neighboring countries. 
The discrepancies for the imports from Singapore are much smaller than the average. 
This might also be related with the imports of the public sector. Singapore Customs 
report that the largest export commodity to Myanmar in terms of value has been refined 
oil, which is mainly imported by the public sector. For Myanmar’s fiscal year 2008, the 
total exports of Singapore to Myanmar were USD1,254 million, of which USD629 
million was refined oil. Thus, small discrepancies for the imports from Singapore might 
be partially attributable to a high proportion of the public sector imports. 
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examined the impacts of Myanmar’s restrictive trade policies on the 
incentives for traders to mis-report, and examined trader behavior. Using the set of 
Myanmar’s trade statistics and the corresponding records of the IMF’s Direction of 
Trade Statistics, the discrepancies in the mirror statistics are considered to be an 
indication of trade mis-reporting.  
The ‘export-first’ policy has restricted import licenses within the applicant’s holdings 
of the export-tax-deducted export earnings. It was examined whether this policy, in 
combination with other restrictions on foreign exchange and foreign trade, would 
provide sufficient incentives to both importers and exporters to adjust mis-reporting 
according to the supply and demand for the export earnings. The Myanmar statistics 
show that the trade of the private sector has been maintaining equilibrium since the 
‘export-first’ policy was tightened in 2000. At the same time, the discrepancies in the 
mirror statistics for both Myanmar’s imports and exports have fluctuated. These suggest 
that traders adjusted mis-reporting in accordance with the supply and demand of the 
export earnings.  
As far as the policy objective of the export earnings conditionality for import 
licensing is to manage the scarce foreign exchange, the export revenue from natural gas 
has made this policy less crucial for the government. To correct traders’ incentives to 
mis-report, one policy option is to abolish the conditionality of the export earnings for 
import licensing. Eliminating this conditionality would save the transaction costs and 
stimulate trade of the private sector. It would also encourage private importers to 
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properly report imports as they no longer have to accept a degree of mark-up for the 
export-tax-deducted export earnings above the parallel market exchange rate. 
As of February 2012, the Government plans to deregulate the ‘export-first’ policy18. 
Import licenses will be obtainable with informally held foreign exchange, with the 
ceiling of USD 10,000 though, once taxes equivalent to the export tax are paid19. This 
easing of restrictions is expected to reduce mis-reporting of imports. Future research 
examining the impacts of this policy change on trade mis-reporting is needed. 
  
                                                  
18 This information is based on the author’s communication with the senior officials of 
the Government of Myanmar in February 2012. 
19 For the amount above USD10,000, documentations on the source of funds are 
necessary. However, this conditionality is from consideration on anti-money laundering. 
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FIGURE 1 
Classification of Trade Mis-reporting 
 
(A) Imports    (B) Exports 
 
Source: Author 
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TABLE 1 
Hypotheses on Trade Mis-reporting 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
Exporters Impact on Impact on 
 ?????
An increase in demand for export earnings ? ?
Importers Impact on Impact on
 ?????
An increase in supply of export earnings ? ?
Suspension of restriction with Lists A and B ? ?
A rise in border trade ? ?
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TABLE 2 
Mirror Statistics of Total Imports and Exports, Fiscal Year 1997-2010 
 
Sources: Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, Central Statistical Organization, Myanmar; Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
Notes: SMEI and DOTS stand for Selected Monthly Economic Indicators and Direction of Trade Statistics, respectively. DOTS data do not include 
imports from and exports to Thailand prior to January 1999. SMEI reports the value of trade in the local currency, kyat. This is converted into US dollars 
using the official exchange rate. 
Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Exports US dollar, millions
Selected Monthly Economic Indicators
    Total 1,036 1,082 1,433 1,961 2,549 3,075 2,356 2,915 3,554 5,223 6,413 6,793 7,569 8,856
     of which Government 266 337 325 581 1,216 1,422 1,048 1,653 1,951 3,155 4,044 4,313 4,481 5,354
     of which Private 770 745 1,109 1,380 1,333 1,653 1,308 1,262 1,603 2,068 2,369 2,480 3,087 3,502
Direction of Trade Statistics 1,148 1,157 1,482 2,266 2,718 2,627 2,973 3,328 3,813 4,638 5,143 6,477 6,134 7,084
SMEI / DOTS (%) 90.3 93.5 96.7 86.5 93.8 117.0 79.3 87.6 93.2 112.6 124.7 104.9 123.4 125.0
Private Exports/(DOTS-Gov. Exports) (%) 87.3 90.8 95.8 81.9 88.8 137.1 68.0 75.3 86.1 139.4 215.5 114.6 186.8 202.5
Imports US dollar, millions
Selected Monthly Economic Indicators
    Total 2,309 2,702 2,605 2,321 2,734 2,297 2,235 1,979 1,982 2,928 3,347 4,563 4,186 6,404
     of which Government 663 882 773 463 958 511 703 626 614 1,125 903 1,971 1,381 1,781
     of which Private 1,645 1,820 1,833 1,857 1,777 1,786 1,532 1,354 1,785 2,339 2,443 2,592 2,806 4,623
Direction of Trade Statistics 2,706 2,443 2,583 2,991 2,695 2,997 3,325 3,487 3,656 4,174 5,933 6,720 7,979 10,640
SMEI / DOTS (%) 85.3 110.6 100.9 77.6 101.5 76.6 67.2 56.8 54.2 70.2 56.4 67.9 52.5 60.2
Private Imports/(DOTS-Gov. Imports) (%) 80.6 116.5 101.2 73.5 102.3 71.8 58.4 47.3 58.7 76.7 48.6 54.6 42.5 52.2
Private Imports/Private Exports (%) 213.7 244.3 165.3 134.6 133.3 108.1 117.1 107.3 111.3 113.1 103.1 104.5 90.9 132.0
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TABLE 3 
Mirror Statistics of Exports and Imports by Destination/ Origin 
(1) Exports 
 
 
(2) Imports 
 
Sources: Same as TABLE 2. 
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TABLE 4 
Share of Imports by Land in Total Imports from China and Thailand, 1999-2010 
 
 
 
Sources: Website of the Department of Border Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar 
http://www.commerce.gov.mm/eng/dobt/by_border_wide.html accessed on August 11, 2010, and January 6, 2012.  
Website of the Bank of Thailand (Foreign Trade through Customs Houses in Northern Region) 
http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=497&language=eng accessed on January 6, 2012.  
Global Trade Information Services, World Trade Atlas Database. 
Notes: (..) means not available. Border trade refers to exports of Thailand and China to Myanmar via land ports.  
 
Proportion
of trade
by land
Discrepancies
Fiscal
Year
(A)
National
Total
(B)
of which
Border
(C)
National
Total
(D)
of which
Border
(D)/(C)
%
(A)/(C)
%
1999 251 .. 385 268 69.6 65.3
2000 286 .. 522 291 55.8 54.7
2001 308 .. 531 283 53.2 57.9
2002 362 .. 789 367 46.5 45.9
2003 470 .. 918 490 53.4 51.2
2004 492 .. 910 499 54.9 54.1
2005 467 195 1,018 582 57.2 45.9
2006 728 297 1,320 687 52.0 55.2
2007 994 422 1,774 834 47.0 56.0
2008 1,207 496 1,946 877 45.1 62.0
2009 1,257 577 2,649 1,289 48.7 47.4
2010 2,165 .. 4,142 1,916 48.7 52.3
Unit: US dollar, million
Imports from China
Myanmar
Imports
Records
Chinese
Exports
Records
Proportion
of trade
by land
Discrepancies
Fiscal
Year
(A)
National
Total
(B)
of which
Border
(C)
National
Total
(D)
of which
Border
(D)/(C)
%
(A)/(C)
%
1999 347 .. 423 144 34.0 82.0
2000 303 .. 467 139 29.7 65.0
2001 268 .. 361 112 31.1 74.0
2002 231 .. 318 94 29.5 72.8
2003 191 .. 484 222 45.8 39.4
2004 184 .. 631 400 63.3 29.1
2005 237 85 722 415 57.4 32.8
2006 304 148 790 385 48.7 38.5
2007 383 156 1,128 545 48.3 34.0
2008 395 189 1,323 760 57.5 29.8
2009 379 135 1,734 1,047 60.4 21.9
2010 710 .. 2,437 1,021 41.9 29.1
Myanmar
Imports
Records
Thai
Exports
Records
Unit: US dollar, million
Imports from Thailand
